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Why Not Take All of Me?1 Reflections on 
The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks2 and 
the Status of Participants in Research 
Using Human Specimens 
Gail Javitt* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is perhaps a truism that each of us is greater than the 
sum of our parts. This is particularly apparent when it comes 
to our tissues, our cells, and their best-known contents, our 
DNA. In a few cases, such as the case of a woman named 
Henrietta Lacks, an individual’s tissue contains such rare 
attributes as to result single-handedly in a scientific paradigm 
shift. More typically, it is the study of vast numbers of tissue 
samples, in concert, that allows science to move forward. 
Indeed, recent genetic discoveries3 made possible by the study 
of vast repositories of tissue samples known as “biobanks” have 
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 1. The phrase is taken from BILLIE HOLIDAY, All of Me, on LADY DAY:  
THE COMPLETE BILLIE HOLIDAY ON COLUMBIA (1933-1944) (Columbia 
Records, 2001) (1941). 
 2. REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010). 
 
 3. European League Against Rheumatism, Increased Levels of Certain 
Cytokines and Chemokines Predict Onset of Rheumatoid Arthritis, E! SCI. 
NEWS, June 15, 2009, 
http://esciencenews.com/articles/2009/06/15/increased.levels.certain.cytokines.
and.chemokines.predict.onset.rheumatoid.arthritis (reporting on a study that 
identified factors that can predict the development of rheumatoid arthritis by 
using blood donated to the Medical Biobank of Northern Sweden). 
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made clear that, when studied in the aggregate, the biological 
information contained in each of our individual bodies can yield 
scientific insights and medical advances impossible through the 
study of any one individual. 
But the use of cells and tissues for research brings with it 
myriad legal and ethical questions. How should we think about 
the contributors of these cells and tissues? Are they—
increasingly “we” as the number of samples contained in 
biobanks grows—human subjects of research? And, if so, what 
consequences should flow from this classification? Should 
contributors be given the opportunity to specify the type of 
research that they will permit, or prohibit, with their 
specimen? Should they be told about potential profits that may 
accrue to researchers from the use of their tissues and, more to 
the point, be entitled to a share of such profits? And what about 
potential health information derived from the research—should 
they have access to it? Should others? Even more challenging, 
what rules should govern the voluntary provision of tissues by 
patient groups to researchers solely for the purpose of 
identifying the cause of their disease and developing 
diagnostics and potential cures for their condition? And 
perhaps most thorny of all: if, as some argue, providing our 
tissues and cells for research is a moral imperative—part of our 
collective civic responsibility4—does that give rise to a 
reciprocal moral imperative to ensure that all participants have 
access to the medical therapies that their cells, among millions 
of others, helped to produce?5 
These questions have been percolating for some time in the 
law and bioethics literature6—ever since a man named Mr. 
                                                          
 4. See, e.g., Rina Hakimian & David Korn, Ownership and Use of Tissue 
Specimens for Research, 292 JAMA 2500, 2504 (2004). 
 5. See Ruth R. Faden, Editorial, “Immortal” Cells, Moral Issues: Case of 
Henrietta Lacks Shows Need for Ethical Component in Health Care Reform, 
BALT. SUN, Feb. 12, 2010, at 21. 
 6. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective 
Regulatory Framework for Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue 
Samples and Health Information, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 737 (1999); Henry 
T. Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale 
Genomic Biobanks, 8 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 343 (2007); 
Karen J. Maschke & Thomas H. Murray, Ethical Issues in Tissue Banking for 
Research: The Prospects and Pitfalls of Setting International Standards, 25 
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 143 (2004); ROBERT F. WEIR & ROBERT S. 
OLICK, THE STORED TISSUE ISSUE: BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, ETHICS, AND LAW 
IN THE ERA OF GENOMIC MEDICINE (2004). 
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Moore had his cancerous spleen removed and parlayed into a 
lucrative cell line by his physician.7 Subsequent decades have 
brought a handful of additional cases whose claimants have 
included a cancer researcher,8 a Native American tribe,9 and 
family members whose relatives suffered from a rare genetic 
disease.10 So far, however, there has not yet emerged a 
groundswell of “tissue rights” activists pressing for a resolution 
of these questions or a consensus on how they should be 
answered. And troublingly, the few courts that have had 
occasion to address these questions have not applied any 
coherent legal construct, but, as this article discusses, have 
retrospectively applied various legal theories in the service of 
what sometimes appear to be preordained policy goals.11 At the 
same time, the number of individuals whose tissue samples are 
contained in biobanks continues to rise, making it foreseeable 
that more such disputes will arise in the future. 
The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, Rebecca Skloot’s 
moving account of a woman whose cancerous cells 
revolutionized medical research and facilitated many of today’s 
lifesaving treatments—vaccines being just one example—thus 
arrives at a particularly ripe time in scientific and societal 
history. By focusing on the life and death of one woman, 
Henrietta Lacks—the mother, literally, of the now-ubiquitous 
HeLa12 cell line—and of the consequences that the use of her 
tissues has had for her descendants, Skloot has put real faces 
                                                          
 7. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 8. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007), aff’g 437 F. 
Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
 9. See Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of 
Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).  This case was recently resolved 
through a settlement agreement in which the Arizona Board of Regents agreed 
to pay $700,000 to forty-one of the Havasupai tribe’s members, to return blood 
samples that were the basis for the suit, and to provide additional assistance 
to the impoverished tribe. See Amy Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit 
Research of Its DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html?ref=us. 
 10. See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. 
Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 11. See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d at 493–96 (holding that there is no property 
interest in cells and policy concern that holding otherwise could hamper 
medical research); Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (holding that accused 
doctor had no duty towards the complainant because the doctor was not the 
treating doctor, and further speculating as to the possible chilling effects of 
holding otherwise). 
 12. See text infra accompanyinig notes 20–25. 
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and voices to abstract legal and policy questions. Although 
some of the specific circumstances that gave rise to her cells 
being used in research without her or her family’s informed 
consent would be prohibited today, the story nevertheless has 
salience to the modern debate. By telling the Lacks family’s 
story in such an engaging, accessible way, Skloot has moved 
the discussion beyond the narrow confines of courtrooms and 
academia and into the public domain, where all those with a 
stake in the answers can participate. 
This article briefly describes the story of Henrietta Lacks, 
as chronicled by Skloot. It then reviews recent findings 
regarding the the public’s attitudes and expectations regarding 
the use of their cells and tissues in research. It contrasts those 
public attitudes and expectations with the judicial resolution of 
legal disputes that have arisen between tissue contributors, 
researchers, and institutions regarding the use of tissue 
samples. Finally, it offers some basic principles that should 
guide the development of policies for the use of human tissue 
samples in research. 
II.  THE STORY OF HENRIETTA LACKS13 
But for her cancer, Henrietta Lacks’s life would have most 
likely gone little noticed.  She was born in 1920, a poor black 
woman from a family of tobacco farmers in rural Virginia.14 In 
the 1940s, she moved with her husband to Baltimore to pursue 
wartime employment opportunities in the shipyards.15 In 1951, 
when she was thirty and had given birth to five children, she 
developed gynecological bleeding and sought care at Johns 
Hopkins in Baltimore, Maryland.16 Hopkins was founded as a 
charity hospital and was the only major hospital in the area 
that would treat African-American patients.17 At Hopkins, her 
                                                          
 13. Unless other sources are cited, the information about Henrietta 
Lacks’s life, the development of HeLa cells, and the views of her family 
members are all derived from Skloot’s account. The author of this paper has no 
independent knowledge of these issues. Additionally, the excerpts from the 
book retain the native dialects of the speakers.  In the preface to the book, 
Skloot stated that she made an intentional choice to “capture the language in 
which each person spoke,” in order to best reflect their lives and experiences.  
See SKLOOT, supra note 2, at  ix. 
 14. See id. at 18. 
 15. Id. at 26. 
 16. Id. at 13–15. 
 17. Id. at 15. 
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physician initiated radium treatment, the standard of care at 
that time.18 While she was under anesthesia for the procedure 
that would sew tubes of radium to her cervix, the doctor 
removed a small piece of her normal cervical tissue and another 
small piece of her cervical cancer tissue, put them in a test 
tube, and sent them to George Gey.19 
George Otto Gey, a physician trained at Hopkins who was 
at the time in his early 50s,20 had spent his career, along with 
his wife and laboratory director Margaret, on a quest to develop 
methods to grow cells outside the body. Keeping cells alive “in 
culture” would allow scientists to experiment on the cells in 
ways not possible in the body and thereby learn more about cell 
biology. In particular, Gey hoped to develop cultures of cancer 
cells to enable the study—and eventual cure—of this dread 
disease.21 Thus, Gey obtained cancerous tissue samples 
wherever he could find them22—and patients from the major 
medical institution in which he worked served as a ready 
source. 
Until the day Henrietta Lacks’s cells were brought to his 
laboratory, Gey’s quest had been unsuccessful. But unlike all 
his other attempts to grow tissues outside the body, Henrietta’s 
survived and thrived in culture, becoming the first 
“immortalized” cell line, meaning cells that will replicate 
themselves indefinitely as long as maintained under proper 
conditions.23 On the day Henrietta died at the age of thirty-one, 
George Gey went on national television announcing that a 
breakthrough had occurred in cancer research.24 Holding up 
the vial of cells, he introduced the world, for the first time, 
“HeLa” cells, named for the first two letters of the first and last 
                                                          
 18. Id. at 31–32. 
 19. Id. at 33. 
 20. See Medical Archives of the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, The 
George O. Gey Collection, http://www.medicalarchives.jhmi.edu/sgml/gey.html 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2010). 
 21. See MICHAEL GOLD, A CONSPIRACY OF CELLS: ONE WOMAN’S 
IMMORTAL LEGACY AND THE MEDICAL SCANDAL IT CAUSED 16 (1986). 
 22. See Rebecca Skloot, Henrietta’s Dance, JOHNS HOPKINS MAG., Apr. 
2000, at 16, available at http://www.jhu.edu/jhumag/0400web/01.html 
[hereinafter Skloot, Henrietta’s Dance]. 
 23. See SKLOOT, supra note 2, at 30; see generally Wikipedia, Biological 
Immortality, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_immortality (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2010). 
 24. See Skloot, Henrietta’s Dance, supra note 22, at 17. 
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name of their source.25 
Had the story ended here, the identity and legacy of 
Henrietta Lacks would forever have remained a mystery. 
Additionally, when viewed from the vantage point of the 1950s, 
there would have been nothing particularly troubling about 
how Gey came to possess ’her cells. At the time neither Gey—
nor pretty much anyone else in medicine—thought it necessary 
to ask permission to remove tissue samples from a patient.26 
Nor would researchers have thought it necessary for family 
members to be told about the tissue sample’s fate, even if that 
fate involved a dramatic scientific discovery using their loved 
one’s tissues. 
But the story did not end there. Although the 
nomenclature used to identify the cell line was standard at the 
time, because current rules about medical confidentiality had 
not been established, it meant that the cells’ source was 
identifiable. Although for many years the source of HeLa cells 
was incorrectly identified in textbooks as “Helen Lane,”27 it was 
perhaps inevitable that the identity of the cells’ true progenitor 
would be revealed. And when her family members learned 
serendipitously about the legacy of their mother’s’ cells two 
decades after her death, they were understandably confused; 
how could their mother, whom her younger children did not 
even remember, still be “alive”? Moreover, they were distressed 
by the unwanted media attention that the revelation of her 
identity brought with it and by the fact that her cells were 
being bought and sold, and angry that no one had asked 
Henrietta—or them—whether her cells could be removed for 
research in the first place.28 
The subsequent action of Hopkins researchers, while 
undertaken with apparently benign intent, only added to 
feelings of deception and exploitation by Lacks’ children. In a 
                                                          
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. at 19 (quoting Ruth Faden, executive director of the Johns 
Hopkins Berman Institute for Bioethics, as describing the lack of informed 
consent in Henrietta Lacks’s case as, “a sad commentary on how the 
biomedical research community thought about research in the 1950s. But it 
was not uncommon for physicians to conduct research on patients without 
their knowledge or consent. That doesn’t make it right. It certainly wasn’t 
right. It was also unfortunately common.”). 
 27. See id at 19; see also SKLOOT, supra note 2, at 108–09. 
 28. See Skloot, Henrietta’s Dance, supra note 22, at 19; see also SKLOOT, 
supra note 2, at 5. 
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bid to address what had become a serious impediment to using 
HeLa cells in research, namely, that the cells were 
contaminating other cell cultures,29 the Hopkins researchers 
sought to leverage newly discovered DNA fingerprinting 
methods to pinpoint whether HeLa cells were in other cells’ 
cultures.30 To do that, however, they needed samples of DNA 
similar to that of the HeLa cells. They turned to Henrietta’s 
children, who had received half of their genetic material from 
her.31 However, although the researchers thought the family 
understood the reason they were being asked to donate blood, 
the family erroneously believed that they were providing blood 
to determine whether they would develop cancer like their 
mother.32 They were understandably worried when they did not 
receive results from the “tests” they thought researchers had 
performed.33 
In addition to satisfying her own longstanding curiosity 
regarding the history of HeLa cells, part of Skloot’s motivation 
in documenting Henrietta’s story appears to have been to help 
Henrietta’s children understand what happened to their 
mother’s cells and gain some measure of closure with regards to 
the wrong they perceive Hopkins to have perpetrated against 
the Lacks family. To this end, she movingly recounts an episode 
in which Hopkins researcher, Christoph Lengauer, invites two 
of Henrietta’s children, Deborah and Zakariyya, to his 
laboratory and shows them their mother’s cells (or, more 
precisely, descendants of those original cells) under the 
microscope.34 In addition to explaining the basics of cell biology 
in a way that they could understand, Lengauer acknowledged 
that the cells had come from a person, who was important not 
only to researchers but to her family members. As recounted by 
Skloot, the interaction between Lengauer and the family is 
revealing of the different perceptions held by different parties 
to the research enterprise and to the complex—and still 
unresolved—issues at play in the use of human specimens: 
“They’re beautiful,” [Deborah] whispered, then went back to staring 
at the slide in silence. Eventually, without looking away from the 
                                                          
 29. SKLOOT, supra note 2, at 153. 
 30. Id. at 216. 
 31. Id. at 185. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 264–66. 
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cells, she said, “God, I never thought I’d see my mother under a 
microscope—I never dreamed this day would ever come.” 
“Yeah, Hopkins pretty much screwed up, I think,” Christoph said. 
Deborah bolted upright and looked at him, stunned to hear a 
scientist—one at Hopkins, no less—saying such a thing. Then she 
looked back into the microscope and said, “John Hopkin [sic] is a 
school for learning, and that’s important. But this is my mother. 
Nobody seem to get that.” 
“It’s true.” Christoph said. “Whenever we read books about science, 
it’s always HeLa this and HeLa that. Some people know those are the 
initials of a person, but they don’t know who that person is. That’s 
important history.” 
Deborah looked like she wanted to hug him. “This is amazing,” she 
said, shaking her head and looking at him like he was a mirage.35 
The discussion between Lengauer and Deborah also 
touched on whether the family should have received a share in 
the monetary profits from HeLa cells. 
“Her cells are how it all started,” [Christoph] said. “Once there is a 
cure for cancer, it’s definitely largely because of your mother’s cells.” 
“Amen,” Deborah said. Then, without a hint of anger, she told him, 
“People always gonna be makin money from them cells, nothing we 
can do about that. But we not gonna get any of it.” 
Christoph said he thought that was wrong. Why not treat valuable 
cells like oil, he said. When you find oil on somebody’s property, it 
doesn’t automatically belong to them, but they do get a portion of the 
profits. “No one knows how to deal with this when it comes to cells 
today,” he said. “When your mother got sick, doctors just did what 
they wanted and patients didn’t ask. But nowadays patients want to 
know what’s going on.”36 
Those who believe that Hopkins’ actions with respect to the 
Lacks family were consistent with the standards of the time, 
and that no admission of wrongdoing is therefore warranted, 
may find Lengauer’s statements naïve at best, and detrimental 
to the scientific enterprise, as well as to Johns Hopkins, at 
worst. It should be noted, however, as Skloot reports, that 
neither Hopkins nor its researchers ever received direct 
financial benefit from HeLa cells; the buying and selling of the 
cells was, and is today, conducted by third parties unaffiliated 
with the institution.37 Still, there is no doubt that the discovery 
was beneficial to the researchers and the institution at which it 
took place, in terms of intellectual achievement and 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 266. 
 36. Id. at 267. 
 37. Id. at 194. 
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professional prestige. 
The duties that Hopkins did or did not owe to Henrietta 
Lacks or her family members at the time their cells were 
removed are beyond the scope of this article. Lengauer’s words 
have relevance to the modern debate about the use of human 
tissue in research in their simple acknowledgment of the 
human origins of tissue samples used in research, of the 
emotions and feelings of attachment that contributors of tissue 
may possess towards their specimens regardless of whether 
they have formal legal rights to them, and thus the perils of 
failing to show respect for and of communicating clearly with 
these contributors. As public opinion research suggests, 
prospective contributors of human tissue, while they recognize 
the value of their specimens for research and largely support 
their use in the interest of findings new treatments for disease, 
also, as Lengauer phrased it, “want to know what’s going on”38 
with their tissue. Moreover, many would-be tissue contributors 
believe researchers are obliged to inform them before using 
their tissues in research.39 As this article discusses, the legal 
disputes arising from use of tissue samples have involved in 
some fashion failures to acknowledge the essential human 
dimensions of the research enterprise involving human tissue. 
III.  OUR BODIES, OURSELVES?40 PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
ABOUT RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SPECIMENS 
A.  WHAT IS A BIOBANK? 
A biobank, also known as a biorepository, is a place that 
“collects, stores, processes, and distributes biological materials 
and the data associated with those materials.”41 These 
“biological materials” are typically human biospecimens, 
including tissue or blood, and the “data” are the clinical 
                                                          
 38. Id. at 267. 
 39. Id. at 315. 
 40. The phrase is taken from THE BOSTON WOMEN’S HEALTH BOOK 
COLLECTIVE, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES:  A NEW EDITION FOR A NEW ERA ix 
(2005). 
 41. See LabAutopedia, Biobank Information and Sites, 
http://labautopedia.com/mw/index.php/Biobank_information_sites#A_compliat
ion_of_external_resources_on_biobanks (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) 
(highlighting that a biobank can also include tissues from other animals, cell 
and bacterial cultures, and even environmental samples). 
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information pertaining to the donor of that biospecimen.42 
Biobanks allow researchers to conduct genome-wide association 
(GWAS) studies, which are studies of the entire genome of 
large numbers of people that seek to identify genetic markers 
for disease.43 In recent years, biobanks have been increasingly 
used to study complex diseases that are believed to have both 
genetic and environmental causes.44 By one estimate, in 1999, 
there were 178 million unique samples contained in 
biorepositories and the rate of increase would be 20 million 
samples per year.45 Assuming this rate of growth is correct, the 
number in 2010 would be 398 million samples. 
 There is no mandated centralized registry of biobanks 
either nationally or internationally; thus the actual number of 
existing biobanks or number of discrete specimens contained 
therein is not known.46 Perhaps the most well-known 
biobanking effort worldwide is in Iceland. At the beginning of 
                                                          
 42. Id. 
 43. See Stephen J. O’Brien, Stewardship of Human Biospecimens, DNA, 
Genotype, and Clinical Data in the GWAS Era, 10 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & 
HUM. GENETICS 193, 194 (2009). 
 44. See Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr., Issue Brief, Using Genomic Databases 
to Study Complex Diseases, available at 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/issuebriefpdfs/Genes%20and%20Environmen
t%20Issue%20Brief.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). For example, diabetes is 
known to run in families, and researchers have identified some genetic 
variants that increase an individual’s risk of developing the disease. However, 
not all individuals who have the variants develop diabetes, and many people 
with diabetes do not have the variants. This suggests that there may be more 
variants that affect the risk of developing the disease, but it is also known that 
diet and exercise play an important role. The collection of large numbers of 
samples in biobanks could assist researchers in studying both genetic and 
environmental factors influencing many common diseases, including diabetes, 
cancer, and heart disease, which could “hold tremendous promise” for 
understanding how those diseases develop. 
 45. See ELISA EISEMAN & SUSANNE B. HAGA, RAND MONOGRAPH REPORT, 
HANDBOOK OF HUMAN TISSUE SOURCES:  A NATIONAL RESOURCE OF HUMAN 
TISSUE SAMPLES xvii (1999). 
 46. Moreover, consensus does not exist regarding what should be 
considered a  “biobank,”  i.e., whether it includes all collections of human 
specimens, regardless of their source, or is limited to only specimens collected 
under particular circumstances. There are different mechanisms by which 
samples become available for research, including from patients (leftover 
samples) and from subjects who are actively recruited. Part of the challenge in 
crafting legal rules in this context is the heterogeneity, and lack of consensus, 
about the scope of what constitutes a biobank.  See Susan M.C. Gibbons, 
Regulating Biobanks:  A Twelve-Point Typological Tool, 17 MED. L. REV. 313 
(2009). 
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2000, deCODE Genetics, Inc., a for-profit genetics company, 
received a license to establish the Icelandic Health Sector 
Database (HSD), based on a law passed in the late 1990s.47 It 
was expected that “the database containing the healthcare data 
and in the health records of all Icelanders alive and deceased 
could be coupled with the genealogy and a genotypic database 
thus yielding a super-database.”48 One of the most controversial 
aspects of the Icelandic law governing the HSD was that it 
permitted the disclosure of patients’ medical records to 
deCODE based on the “presumed consent” of the patients 
rather than express informed consent.49 Although the biobank 
has been a “boon for genome-wide association studies,” the 
company’s efforts to develop drugs from its research findings 
have not been financially successful; the company was forced to 
declare bankruptcy in 2009 and, in January 2010, was 
purchased by Saga Investments LLC, a private consortium.50 
Other countries have invested significant resources in the 
development of national biorepositories. For example, the UK 
Biobank, a not-for-profit charitable company funded by both 
public and private sources,51 contains biological samples from 
more than 340,000 individuals and seeks to eventually collect 
samples from 500,000 individuals.52 In Canada, the 
CARTaGene Project is currently seeking to recruit “a random 
sample of 20,223 adults aged between 40 and 69 years from 
                                                          
 47. See Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir, Genes of a Nation: The Promotion of 
Iceland’s Genetic Information, 8 TRAMES 178, 178 (2004). 
 48. Id at 178–79. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Jocelyn Kaiser, Cash-Starved deCODE is Looking for a Rescuer for 
its Biobank, 325 SCI. 1054, 1054 (2009).  According to a company press release, 
“deCODE will continue all of its operations and product lines in this field, 
including its deCODE diagnostics disease risk tests; deCODEme™ personal 
genome scans; and contract service offerings including genotyping, sequencing 
and data analysis. Going forward, deCODE  will concentrate on translating its 
science into medically and commercially important products and services.” 
Press Release, deCode Genetics, Announcing the New deCode, Jan. 21, 2010, 
available at http://www.decode.com/news/news.php?story=112. 
 51. Press Release, UK Biobank, HRH The Princess Royal Officially Opens 
UK Biobank Storage Facility, Further Funding of £6 Million Announced (July 
28, 2009), available at http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/HRHVisit.pdf. 
 52. See Genetics Perspectives on Policy Seminar, Genetic Biobanks: 
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Consumer Protection 4 (Dec. 9, 2008) (transcript 
of National Press Club panel discussion), 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/GenePOPS11transcriptedited.pdf 
[hereinafter Genetics Perspectives Seminar]. 
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four metropolitan areas of Quebec” and to “create a bank 
containing data on health and a biobank containing biological 
material.”53 Other countries are also establishing biobanks.54 In 
the United States, there are several large scale biorepositories 
under the aegis of large academic institutions: Vanderbilt 
University Medical Center,55 the Marshfield Clinic,56 and 
Northwestern University.57 Kaiser Permanente, which is the 
largest not-for-profit private health care provider in United 
States,58 has also established a biobank and is recruiting 
participants to contribute samples. The biobank contains 
40,000 DNA samples from its members as of early 2009 and is 
expected to contain 500,000 samples by 2010.59 The Kaiser 
biobank is notable for the depth of information it will contain, 
                                                          
 53. CARTaGENE, General Objectives, 
http://www.cartagene.qc.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14
&Itemid=22 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). The CARTaGENE Project is fully 
publicly funded and will seek to recruit an additional 30,000 patients in 2011 
if its public funding is renewed. See CARTaGENE, CARTaGENE Project FAQ, 
http://www.cartagene.qc.ca/index.php?option=com_easyfaq&Itemid=52&lang=
english (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
 54. See, e.g.  Norwegian Inst. of Pub. Health, Welcome to Biohealth 
Norway, 
http://www.fhi.no/eway/default.aspx?pid=238&trg=MainArea_5811&MainAre
a_5811=5906:0:15,4627:1:0:0:::0:0 (last visited May 10, 2010) (Norwegian 
biobank intended to comprise “biological samples and standardized health and 
exposure data from 500,000 Norwegian individuals of all ages, corresponding 
to approximately 1/10 of the Norwegian population.”); LifeGene, About 
LifeGene, http://lifegene.ki.se/about/index_en.html (last visited May 10, 2010) 
(Swedish biobank intended to collect biological samples and medical 
information for 500,000 individuals in Sweden). 
 55. Dep’t of Biomed. Informatics, Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., Vanderbilt 
BioVU: Vanderbilt’s DNA Databank, 
http://dbmi.mc.vanderbilt.edu/research/dnadatabank.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2010). Vanderbilt’s biobank, which is known as “BioVU,” contains two 
main components: a biobank of DNA samples from more than 50,000 
individuals coded by a “Research Unique Identifier (RUI) and the “Synthetic 
Derivative” database, a collection of deidentified information extracted from 
Vanderbilt Medical Center’s electronic clinical information systems. 
 56. See Genetics Perspectives Seminar, supra note 52, at 4. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Kaiser Permanente, Fast Facts About Kaiser Permanente, 
http://xnet.kp.org/newscenter/aboutkp/fastfacts.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2010). According to the company’s website, Kaiser serves more than 8.6 
million members. 
 59. Susan J. Landers, Kaiser Fills a Biobank with a Wealth of Data, AM. 
MED. NEWS, Jan. 13, 2009, http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2009/01/12/hlsc0113.htm. 
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combining the participants’ DNA samples with “information on 
their health, the air they breath[e] and their likely exposure to 
toxins. The bank will also note whether sidewalks or safe parks 
are near enough to allow the participants to exercise or if 
nearby stores sell fresh vegetables.”60 
B. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD BIOBANKING 
In recent years there have been several efforts to better 
understand the public’s attitudes toward, and willingness to 
contribute tissue samples to biobanks for research. This article 
does not provide a comprehensive review of the literature—
much of which reports on research conducted in non-U.S. 
populations.61 It also recognizes that, to the extent the research 
discussed was conducted using hypothetical scenarios, asking 
people what they would do under certain conditions may not be 
an accurate measure of how people actually behave when 
confronted with real-world circumstances.62 Nevertheless, this 
type of research provides some insight regarding the public’s 
views regarding use of their tissues in research. Studies to date 
appear to support the following with respect to the attitudes of 
the U.S. population: (1) there is significant public support for 
the goals of biobank research;63 (2) a majority of the public 
                                                          
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Philippe A. Melas et al., Examining The Public Refusal to 
Consent to DNA Biobanking:  Empirical Data from a Swedish Population-
Based Study, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 93 passim (2010); Aaro Tupasela et al., 
Attitudes Towards Biomedical Use of Tissue Sample Collections, Consent, and 
Biobanks Among Finns, 38 SCANDINAVIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 46 passim (2010); 
Klaus Hoeyer, Donors Perceptions of Consent to and Feedback from Biobank 
Research:  Time to Acknowledge Diversity?, PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS, Nov. 26, 
2009, 
http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/produkte.asp?Aktion=ShowFulltext&A
rtikelNr=262329&Ausgabe=0&ProduktNr=224224; Hazel Thornton, The UK 
Biobank Project:  Trust and Altruism Are Alive and Well:  A Model for 
Achieving Public Support for Research Using Personal Data, 7 INT’L J. 
SURGERY 501 passim (2009); Shaun Treweek, Alex Doney & David Leiman, 
Public Attitudes to the Storage of Blood Left Over from Routine General 
Practice Tests and its Use in Research, 14 J. HEALTH SERVICES RES. & POL’Y 
13 passim (2009). 
 62. See generally GEORGE F. BISHOP, THE ILLUSION OF PUBLIC OPINION: 
FACT AND ARTIFACT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS passim (2005). 
 63. See SHAWNA WILLIAMS ET AL., GENETICS AND PUB. POLICY CTR., 
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., THE GENETICS TOWN HALL: PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT 
RESEARCH ON GENES, ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH passim (2008), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Genetics_a
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would agree, at least under some conditions, to contribute 
tissue samples for research;64 (3) there is significant public 
concern about ensuring the privacy of the information derived 
from their tissue sample as well as any associated medical 
information that is included about them as part of the 
research;65 and (4) there is significant public interest in 
receiving information from research conducted with their 
tissues if it could be relevant to one’s health, and in having a 
choice regarding what information they receive.66 
A study undertaken by the Genetics and Public Policy 
Center, at Johns Hopkins University, in 2007 is one example of 
research that supports the above conclusions.67 The Center 
sought to assess attitudes regarding a proposal being 
considered by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and 
other agencies to create a biobank including a nationally 
representative sample of at least 500,000 people in order to 
study the roles of genes and environment in health.68 Through 
a combination of focus groups, town halls, and an online survey 
of more than 4,500 U.S. adults, the Center assessed the public’s 
willingness to participate in such research, privacy concerns, 
views about informed consent and data sharing, and the impact 
of modest incentives on willingness to participate.69 
The population-based survey revealed that a majority of 
respondents supported the general idea of the study and would 
                                                          
nd_Public_Policy/2009PCPTownHalls.pdf; David Kaufman et al., Veterans’ 
Attitudes Regarding a Database for Genetic Research, 11 GENETICS MED., May 
2009, at passim [hereinafter Kaufman et al., Veterans’ Attitudes]. 
 64. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 63, at passim; David Kaufman et al., 
Public Opinion About the Importance of Privacy in Biobank Research, 85 AM. 
J. HUM. GENETICS,  Nov. 2009, at passim [hereinafter Kaufman et al., Public 
Opinion]; Kaufman et al., Veterans’ Attitudes, supra note 63, at passim. 
 65. WILLIAMS ET AL.,  supra note 63, at 8. 
 66. Id. at 9; Kaufman et al., Veterans’ Attitudes, supra note 63, at 334; 
Murphy et al., Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-Cohort 
Genetic Research, AM. J. BIOETHICS,  Nov. 2008, at 36–41 [hereinafter Murphy 
et al., Public Expectations]. 
 67. Results from this study were reported in a number of publications: 
Kaufman et al., Public Opinion, supra note 64, at passim; Juli Murphy et al., 
Informed Perspectives on Health: Public Perspectives on Informed Consent for 
Biobanking, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2128 passim (2009) [hereinafter Murphy 
et al., Informed Perspectives]; Murphy et al., Public Expectations, supra note 
66, at 36–41 . 
 68. Murphy et al., Informed Perspectives, supra note 67, at 2129. 
 69. Id. 
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likely participate if asked.70 However, significant concern was 
expressed about whether the privacy of their medical 
information would be protected.71 Black non-Hispanics, 
American Indians, Alaskan Natives, and participants who “self-
identified” as multi-racial were all “significantly more likely” 
than white participants to state that they were concerned about 
the privacy of their medical information.72 
The survey also assessed preferences regarding consent. 
Nearly half of those surveyed expressed a preference that 
consent be obtained at the outset of all research to be 
undertaken and not prior to each individual research project. 73 
Supporters of this type of “blanket” consent appreciated that by 
allowing participants to pick and choose the type of research 
they would consent to, the ability to conduct the research could 
be compromised, or at least made more complex.74 However, a 
sizeable minority expressed a preference for separate consent 
for each project undertaken with their samples.75  Findings 
from the focus groups also shed light on individuals’ 
preferences regarding the return of research results. Focus 
group participants were asked their preferences for receiving 
results from different types of studies. While preferences 
varied, accuracy of the information was a key predictor of 
whether participants wanted to receive their results. 
Actionability of information76 did not appear to be a strong 
predictor of desire for return of results. For example, the 
participants in the focus groups voiced a “strong desire” for the 
research results, “even if they indicated a heightened risk of an 
untreatable disease such as Alzheimer.”77 As one male focus 
group participant stated, “You have an obligation to tell these 
people. They expect something back from you. I’m volunteering 
some of my flesh for you to evaluate me. Tell me what’s wrong 
with it. Not that you could do something about it necessarily, 
                                                          
 70. Id. at 2131; see also Kaufman et al., Public Opinion, supra note 64, at 
645. 
 71. Murphy et al., Informed Perspectives, supra note 67, at 2131; Kaufman 
et al., Public Opinion, supra note 64, at 645. 
 72. Kaufman et al., Public Opinion, supra note 64, at 645. 
 73. Murphy et al., Informed Perspectives, supra note 67, at 2131. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Murphy et al., Public Expectations, supra note 66, at 39. 
 77. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 63, at 9. 
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but at least let me know.”78 
Some participants, however, believed that subjects should 
recognize that the purpose of the research is to “generate 
knowledge for the common good, and should participate out of 
altruism rather than a desire to obtain results.”79 
Members in most focus groups expressed the view that 
study participants should be given choices at the beginning of 
the study about what research results they would receive and 
the frequency and mode of communication in which they 
received them.80 
The focus groups also yielded interesting, although 
incomplete, insights into the public’s perception of the 
participant-researcher relationship.  According to the findings, 
the term “contract” arose spontaneously and repeatedly in 
discussing study participation.81 Focus group members “viewed 
a contract as a binding agreement between participants and 
researchers and did not view it simply as participants’ 
agreement to participate.”82  According to the findings, focus 
group members “thought that a contract might offer 
participants greater protection than an institutional review 
board or study oversight committee and provide participants 
with some level of recourse if researchers strayed from the 
agreed-upon terms.”83 Participants also identified specific 
terms they believed should be included in the contract between 
researchers and participants, such as what specific samples 
would be collected, how they would be used during the study, 
who would have access to data from the study, what would 
happen to the samples and data after the study closed, and 
what would happen if the terms of the contract were 
breached.84 While acknowledging that more research on the 
specific understanding of the term “contract” would be useful, 
the Center concluded that, “the repeated use of ‘contract’ by 
focus group participants in each city and the overwhelming 
desire for a contract demonstrated by the survey data 
suggested that the public believes that there are or should be 
                                                          
 78. Murphy et al., Public Expectations, supra note 66, at 40. 
 79. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 63, at 9. 
 80. Murphy et al., Public Expectations, supra note 66, at 40. 
 81. Murphy et al., Informed Perspectives, supra note 67, at 2131. 
 82. Id. at 2132. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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reciprocal obligations between researcher and participant.”85 
The Center also hypothesized that the desire for a contract 
may reflect a lack of trust in the research enterprise,86 but 
noted that the success of biobanks “depends upon ongoing 
public support, participation, and trust in the research 
endeavor.”87 The importance of trust was similarly observed in 
a survey conducted by researchers at Duke University, who 
found that willingness to participate in biobank research is 
strongly correlated with the degree of trust that respondents 
have in researchers.88 As discussed in the next section, the 
current regulatory framework is not optimized to instill trust 
and foster participation in biobank research. 
IV.  PERCEPTION V. REALITY: THE CURRENT LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE 
A.  HISTORICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTION 
The current framework for human subject protection is 
rooted in, and is a reaction to, extreme physical and 
psychological abuse. The Nuremberg Code—the seminal 
articulation of the rights due participants in medical 
research—emerged in the aftermath of unspeakable Nazi 
atrocities in which prisoners were subjected to grueling 
experiments of no possible benefit to them.89 The subsequent 
Belmont Report,90 which laid the intellectual foundations for 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 2133. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Murphy et al., Public Expectations, supra note 66, at 41. 
 88. Laura M. Beskow & Elizabeth Dean, Informed Consent for 
Biorepositories: Assessing Prospective Participants’ Understanding and 
Opinions, 17 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1440, 1440 
(2008). 
 89. See 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181–82 (1951) 
[hereinafter NURENBERG CODE]. Among other principles, the Code states that 
the “voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential,” and 
specifies the components of such consent.  The Code also specifies the limits of 
the risks that subjects should be asked to assume as part of research and 
articulates the duties that researchers owe to research participants: “The duty 
and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each 
individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment.” Id. at 181. 
 90. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192–97 (April 18, 
1979), available at 
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legal protections for research subjects in the United States, was 
written in response to, among other abuses, the decades-long 
government-funded study in which poor black men with 
syphilis were denied effective treatment in order to study the 
natural history of disease.91 
Thus the current legal framework for human subject 
protection92—now nearing its fourth decade—was developed in 
response to predominantly physical harms perpetrated on 
vulnerable populations—including prisoners,93 children,94 the 
disabled,95 and minorities96—who were unwilling or unwitting 
subjects of research. A key remedial purpose of this framework 
was to ensure that no human being would be required to take 
part in physically risky research against his will. To effectuate 
this purpose, a key component of the framework requires full 
disclosure of the risks of participation to the individual prior to 
any agreement to participate in research—what we now know 
as “informed consent.” To be sure, the rules have been 
broadened beyond that foundation to encompass certain types 
of non-interventional research,97 but they are nevertheless 
rooted in concerns about preventing physical harm to 
vulnerable populations. 
As discussed below, the use of tissue in research was not 
contemplated at the time current regulations were put in place. 
Yet, as discussed previously, the collection and use of stored 
tissue for research has become commonplace, from our first day 
of life forward.98 As discussed below, there are no generally 
                                                          
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.htm. 
 91. JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 
passim (1981). 
 92. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2009). 
 93. See ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL 
REPORT pt. 2, ch. 9, at 263–83 (1995), available at 
http://www.hss.energy.gov/healthsafety/ohre/roadmap/achre/report.html. 
 94. See id. at ch. 7, at 196–226. 
 95. See id. at ch. 5, at 139–71. 
 96. See id. 
 97. For example, the Common Rule covers research in which only 
information is obtained from subjects if  the information obtained “is recorded 
in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through 
identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects’ 
responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of 
criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, 
employability, or reputation.” 45 C.F.R. §  46.101(b)(2) (2009). 
 98. Nearly every newborn in the United States has a small quantity of 
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applicable rules governing the research use of such tissues. 
Whether and to what extent federal rules apply depend on (1) 
whether the research at issue is federally funded,99 and (2) 
whether the tissue samples used in the research can be linked 
back to their source, i.e., if they are “identifiable.”100 Even 
where federal regulations do apply, they do not address many 
of the concerns and preferences—discussed above—of the 
contributors of such tissue. For non-federally funded research, 
the applicable requirements vary based on individual state 
laws, and, as described below, different courts have invoked 
different legal theories to resolve disputes between researchers, 
                                                          
blood removed and tested for certain genetic disorders. The blood is collected 
on “Guthrie cards,” which are named for the individual who developed them. 
See Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly, Stored Guthrie Cards as DNA 
“Banks”, 55 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 196, 196 (1994).The cards are often stored 
indefinitely, and there are no uniform policies regarding their destruction or 
use in research. Guthrie cards have the potential to be immensely useful in 
research because they can be linked with the individual’s medical record, and 
a researcher can obtain follow-up information to track the individual 
longitudinally. Guthrie cards are also useful even if they are “anonymized.” 
Their use in research, however, is controversial because they were obtained for 
a health-related purpose and are being re-directed for research without the 
consent of the parents or the child. At least two states, Texas and Minnesota, 
have recently faced litigation brought by civil rights groups representing 
parents concerned about potential uses of their children’s blood stored on 
Guthrie cards. See Adam Doerr, Newborn Blood Spot Litigation: 70 Days to 
Destroy 5+ Million Samples, GENOMICS L. REP. (Feb. 2, 2010), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/02/02/newborn-blood-spot-
litigation-70-days-to-destroy-5-million-samples/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2010); 
Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Newborn Blood Spot Litigation Continues in 
Minnesota and Texas, PREDICTER NEWS (Nov. 20, 2009, 10:09 AM), 
http://predicter.blogspot.com/2009/11/newborn-blood-spot-litigation-
continues.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2010) (describing the Minnesota and 
Texas litigation). As a result of a settlement in the Texas litigation, the State 
of Texas has agreed to destroy blood samples collected from more than 5 
million newborn babies over the last five years. See Doerr, supra. The judge in 
the Minnesota litigation dismissed the case in late November 2009, but the 
plaintiffs plan to appeal the decision and to continue to object to the State’s 
retention and use of newborn’s blood samples in research. See Katherine 
Drabiak-Syed, Minnesota Judge’s Dismissal of Newborn Blood Spot Case 
Misses the Mark, PREDICTER NEWS (Dec. 14, 2009, 8:27 AM), 
http://predicter.blogspot.com/2009/12/minnesota-judges-dismissal-of-
newborn.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2010). 
 99. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2009). 
 100. See OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON RESEARCH INVOLVING CODED PRIVATE 
INFORMATION OR BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/cdebiol.pdf [hereinafter 
OHRP GUIDANCE]. 
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participants, and institutions. 
B. FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF TISSUE-BASED RESEARCH 
The “Common Rule,”101 as the federal human subject 
protection regulations are known as, sets forth requirements 
for the protection of all human subjects of federally funded 
research. These requirements include that the investigators 
obtain the “legally effective informed consent of the subject or 
the subject’s legally authorized representative.”102 
The Common Rule applies to “all research involving 
human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to 
regulation by any federal department or agency which takes 
appropriate administrative action to make the policy applicable 
to such research.”103 Although the federal regulations do not 
                                                          
 101. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2009). 
 102. Id. § 46.116.  The basic elements of informed consent include: (1) a 
statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the purposes of 
the research and the expected duration of the subject’s participation, a 
description of the procedures to be followed, and identification of any 
procedures that are experimental;  (2) a description of any reasonably 
foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject;  (3) a description of any benefits 
to the subjects or to others which may reasonably be expected from the 
research;  (4) a disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of 
treatment, if any, that might be advantageous to the subject;  (5) a statement 
describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality of records identifying the 
subject will be maintained;  (6) for research involving more than minimal risk, 
an explanation as to whether any compensation and an explanation as to 
whether any medical treatments are available if injury occurs and, if so, what 
they consist of, or where further information may be obtained;  (7) an 
explanation of whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions about the 
research and research subject’s rights, and whom to contact in the event of a 
research-related injury to the subject;  and (8) a statement that participation 
is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue 
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the 
subject is otherwise entitled. 
 103. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2009). 
“Research” is defined as “a systematic investigation, including research 
development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to 
generalizable knowledge.”  Id. § 46.102(d).  The term “human subject” is 
defined as “a living individual about whom an investigator (whether 
professional or student) conducting research obtains (1) Data through 
intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2) Identifiable private 
information.”  Id. § 46.102(f).  “Private information” is defined as “information 
about behavior that occurs in a context in which an individual can reasonably 
expect that no observation or recording is taking place, and information which 
has been provided for specific purposes by an individual and which the 
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explicitly define research with human tissue specimens as 
human subject research, if such research involved “identifiable 
private information,” it would clearly be encompassed within 
the definition.104 However, what about tissue specimens from 
which identifiers have been removed? The regulations 
specifically exempt from the requirements of Part 46 research 
that uses existing stored tissue specimens if “the information is 
recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects 
cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the 
subjects.”105 In addition, guidance issued by the Office of 
Human Research Protections, within the NIH, states that 
research involving “coded,” or non-identifiable, human 
specimens is not considered human subjects research.106 
In short, federally funded research involving identifiable 
human biological specimens generally is considered human 
subject research for the purposes of the Common Rule, while 
federally funded research involving samples whose identity has 
                                                          
individual can reasonably expect will not be made public (for example a 
medical record).”  Id.  The regulation provides, further:  “Private information 
must be individually identifiable (i.e., the identity of the subject is or may 
readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated with the information) 
in order for obtaining the information to constitute research involving human 
subjects.” Id. 
 104. This is confirmed by the guidance document issued by the Office of 
Human Research Protections (OHRP) of the NIH, which provides that, for the 
purpose of the definition of human subject under 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f), 
obtaining identifiable private information or identifiable specimens includes: 
“(1) using, studying, or analyzing for research purposes identifiable private 
information or identifiable specimens that have been provided to investigators 
from any source; and (2) using, studying, or analyzing for research purposes 
identifiable private information or identifiable specimens that were already in 
the possession of the investigator.” OHRP GUIDANCE, supra note 100, at 3. The 
guidance provides that OHRP considers specimens to be “individually 
identifiable as defined at 45 CFR 46.102(f) when they can be linked to specific 
individuals by the investigator(s) either directly or indirectly through coding 
systems.” Id. 
 105. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R § 46.101(b)(4) (2009) 
(emphasis added). 
 106. See OHRP GUIDANCE, supra note 100, at 3. The OHRP GUIDANCE 
uses the term “coded” to signify that human specimens contain “identifying 
information (such as name or social security number) . . . [that] has been 
replaced with a number, letter, symbol, or combination thereof (i.e., the 
code); . . . and a key to decipher the code exists, enabling linkage of the 
identifying information to the . . . specimens.” Id. The OHRP GUIDANCE 
clarifies the circumstances under which OHRP does not consider research 
involving coded specimens to involve human subjects. 
Id. at 4. 
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been removed or has not been recorded generally is not 
considered human subject research according to the statutory 
definition.107 Even where the use of specimens is considered 
human subject research, however, this does not mean that 
researchers must address all of the issues that participants in 
such research might view as important. For example, the 
federal regulations do not require that participants be told all 
of the possible uses of their tissue or to provide information 
about study results.108 Nor do they clearly require researchers 
to disclose whether and to what extent the research may have 
commercial application.109 Thus even where they apply, the 
protections provided under the Common Rule may not be 
consonant with the expectations and preferences of those who 
contribute their tissue for research.110 Additionally, the 
                                                          
 107. In contrast, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does appear to 
consider research involving deidentified human specimens to be human 
subject research, but the agency has stated that it will exercise enforcement 
discretion and exempt such research from informed consent requirements if 
certain conditions are met. See Food and Drug Admin., Guidance for Sponsors, 
Institutional Review Bds., Clinical Investigators and FDA Staff: Guidance on 
Informed Consent for In Vitro Diagnostic Device Studies Using Leftover 
Human Specimens That are Not Individually Identifiable (Apr. 25, 2006), 
available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm071265.pdf [hereinafter FDA, Guidance on Informed 
Consent]. 
 108. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2009) (listing 
the requirements for informed consent under the rule). 
 109.  45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3) does require that informed consent include a 
“description of any benefits to the subject or to others which may reasonably 
be expected from the research.”  It could be argued that benefits to the 
researcher from commercialization should be included within this language.  
However, OHRP guidance on disclosure of financial interests does not 
mandate any specific disclosure but rather raises points for IRBs, institutions, 
and researchers to consider in “determining whether specific financial 
interests in research affect the rights and welfare of human subjects and if so, 
what actions could be considered to protect those subjects.”  Dep’t of Health 
and Human Services, Final Guidance Document, 
Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving Human Subjects: 
Guidance 
for Human Subject Protection (2004), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/finreltn/fguid.pdf. 
 110. Moreover, under certain circumstances, an IRB may even waive the 
requirement for informed consent.  45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c) provides: 
An IRB may approve a consent procedure which does not include, or 
which alters, some or all of the elements of informed consent set forth 
above, or waive the requirement to obtain informed consent provided 
the IRB finds and documents that: 
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regulations have no applicability to research conducted with 
private funds.111 
C. CASE LAW 
 Although there have been only a few legal cases 
involving disputes between the parties to human tissue 
research, their resolution reveals starkly the gaps in the 
current oversight framework as well as a lack of shared 
perceptions by the different parties to the enterprise. 
Furthermore, the lack of consistency in the opinions, as well as 
the differences among jurists in the same case, demonstrates 
the wide divergence of views on the issues and the need 
                                                          
    (1) The research or demonstration project is to be conducted by or 
subject to the approval of state or local government officials and is 
designed to study, evaluate, or otherwise examine: (i) public benefit or 
service programs; (ii) procedures for obtaining benefits or services 
under those programs; (iii) possible changes in or alternatives to 
those programs or procedures; or (iv) possible changes in methods or 
levels of payment for benefits or services under those programs; and 
    (2) The research could not practicably be carried out without the 
waiver or alteration. 
 111. However, FDA has created regulations requiring anyone who submits 
a marketing application for a drug, biological product, or medical device to 
disclose information about the compensation to, and financial interests of, any 
clinical investigator conducting clinical studies covered by the rule. See 21 
C.F.R. §§ 54.1(b), 312.53(c)(4), 314.50(k), 320.36(b), 330.10(f), 601.2(a), 
807.31(d)(3), 812.43(c)(5), 814(b)(12), 860.123(a)(10) (2009). Under the 
regulations, an applicant is required to submit to FDA a list of clinical 
investigators who conducted covered clinical studies and certify and/or disclose 
certain financial arrangements as follows: 
1. [The applicant must certify] that no financial arrangements with 
an investigator have been made where study outcome could affect 
compensation; that the investigator has no proprietary interest in the 
tested product; that the investigator does not have a significant 
equity interest in the sponsor of the covered study; and that the 
investigator has not received significant payments of other sorts; 
and/or 
2. [The applicant must disclose certain] specified financial 
arrangements and any steps taken to minimize the potential for bias. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY:  FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS (Mar. 20, 
2001), http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126832.htm  
[hereinafter FDA GUIDANCE]. FDA’s medical device regulations define a 
“subject” as “a human who participates in an investigation, either as an 
individual on whom or on whose specimen an investigational device is used or 
as a control.” Medical Devices, Investigational Device Exemptions, 21 C.F.R. § 
812.3(p) (2009) (emphasis added). 
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prospectively112 to establish and apply clear and consistent 
rules. From a doctrinal perspective, perhaps the most troubling 
aspect of the current case law is that it fails to distinguish 
clearly between the goal of informed consent, which, as 
demonstrated above, is to protect vulnerable research 
participants from abuses at the hands of researchers, and the 
quasi-contractual concept of donation, which presumes that the 
donor is in an equal position relative to the recipient and 
therefore has the ability to establish the terms of the 
donation.113 
The first, and perhaps best known, legal dispute involving 
the rights and expectations of human tissue contributors was 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California.114 Mr. Moore 
suffered from hairy-cell leukemia, and the recommended 
treatment included removal of his spleen.115 The surgery was 
apparently successful, and Mr. Moore recovered from his 
illness.116  However, on several occasions his physician asked 
him to return for follow-up visits and provide additional blood 
samples, ostensibly to monitor his health.117 
Without his knowledge, Moore’s treating physician, Dr. 
Golde, along with a researcher he worked with, Dr. Quan, used 
Moore’s cells from his spleen and other tissue samples he had 
provided to develop a cell line.118 The University of California 
Los Angeles (UCLA), which employed Dr. Golde and Dr. Quan, 
filed a patent for the cell line, which listed Dr. Golde and Dr. 
Quan as the inventors.119 UCLA and Dr. Golde then licensed 
the cell line to two companies, who provided stock options, 
                                                          
 112. This article should not be construed to recommend a categorical 
prohibition on the use of specimens already contained in biorepositories whose 
contributors are unknown, and in many cases are deceased. However, the 
failure prospectively to develop rules to govern the use of specimens has 
caused significant practical problems for researchers, as well as for 
manufacturers, who rely on such samples to develop  new medical products. 
See, e.g., FDA, Guidance on Informed Consent, supra 107 (discussing the 
difficulties associated with finding the source of a leftover specimen and 
obtaining his or her consent, but noting that human subject protection still 
must be ensured). 
 113. See infra note 157. 
 114. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 115. Id. at 481. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 481–82. 
 119. Id. 
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consulting fees, and salary support to Golde in exchange for 
exclusive access to the materials and research performed, as 
well as to the products derived from the cell line.120 
When he discovered what had been done with his cells, 
Moore sued UCLA, the researchers, and the companies for a 
share of the profits derived from his cells.121 He asserted that 
the unauthorized use of his cells constituted “conversion,” a 
common law tort involving interference with one’s ownership or 
right to possession of property.122 To succeed on a conversion 
cause of action, a plaintiff must demonstrate ownership or the 
right to possess the property in question.123 In denying Moore’s 
conversion claim, the majority held that he had no ownership 
interest in his cells.124 The court’s review of existing laws led to 
the conclusion that Moore lacked the requisite property interest 
to sustain a cause of action for conversion and that applying 
this theory to Moore’s situation would require expanding the 
scope of the tort.125 The majority declined to undertake such 
expansion, citing concerns about hindering the conduct of 
research by placing unreasonable burdens on researchers.126 
Adopting the theory of liability asserted by Moore “threatens to 
destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical 
research. If the use of cells in research is a conversion, then 
with every cell sample a researcher purchases a ticket in a 
litigation lottery.”127 Furthermore, “[b]ecause liability for 
conversion is predicated on a continuing ownership interest, 
‘companies are unlikely to invest heavily in developing, 
manufacturing, or marketing a product when uncertainty about 
                                                          
 120. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 482 (Cal. 1990). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 487. 
 123. Id. at 488. 
 124. See id. at 492–93. First, the court rejected the argument that a person 
has an absolute right to the unique products of his or her body on the basis 
that Moore’s cells were “no more unique to Moore than the number of 
vertebrae in the spine or the chemical formula for hemoglobin.” Id. at 490. 
Furthermore, the court reviewed California statutes dealing with various 
types of tissues and concluded that these laws did not treat tissues as 
property, but rather as “objects sui generis,” and that different types of tissues 
were subject to different legal requirements based on the policy objective 
sought to be achieved. See id. at 489. 
 125. Id. at 493. 
 126. See  Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493–96 (Cal. 
1990). 
 127. Id. at 495–96. 
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clear title exists.’”128 The court stated that extending property 
rights to excised tissues was within the proper purview of the 
legislature, not the courts.129 
The court also rejected the argument that allowing a cause 
of action for conversion was necessary to protect a patient’s 
autonomy and dignity, holding that such interests were 
adequately protected through informed consent.130 The court 
did appear sensitive to the fact that Moore’s physician had 
failed to tell him how his cells were being used and, moreover, 
had induced him to provide additional samples following his 
surgery under false pretenses.131 However, the court appeared 
to believe that expanding the physician’s duties of informed 
consent could provide adequate protection against such 
deception.132 Indeed, the court found that Dr. Golde had 
breached his duty of informed consent by failing to inform 
Moore of his economic interest in the cells before seeking his 
consent to perform surgery.133 The court stated that, just as 
patients must be told about physical risks of a procedure, they 
must be informed of economic interests that might cloud the 
physician’s judgment.134 
[A] physician who treats a patient in whom he also has a research 
interest has potentially conflicting loyalties. This is because medical 
treatment decisions are made on the basis of proportionality—
weighing the benefits to the patient against the risks to the 
patient . . . . A physician who adds his own research interests to this 
balance may be tempted to order a scientifically useful procedure or 
test that offers marginal, or no, benefits to the patient.135 
In holding in favor of Moore on informed consent while 
ruling against his claim of conversion, the court appears to 
have been balancing its desire to protect the research 
enterprise while preventing blatant deception of patients. 
However, the court’s reasoning with respect to informed 
consent is flawed. In particular, the court failed to distinguish 
between Moore as a patient and Moore as a research subject. 
                                                          
 128. Id. at 496. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 496–97. 
 131. See id. at 496 n.41. 
 132. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 496–97 (Cal. 
1990). 
 133. Id. at 486, 497. 
 134. Id. at 485. 
 135. Id. at 484 (emphasis in original). 
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Although there was evidence presented to the district court 
that Golde was aware of the potentially lucrative nature of 
Moore’s cells before he removed his spleen, and therefore had a 
potentially conflicting interest,136 there was no evidence that 
this actually motivated his decision to perform the surgery or, 
moreover, that the surgery was not the appropriate treatment 
for Moore’s underlying medical condition. Disclosing his 
financial interest might have led Moore to seek a different 
doctor, but presumably that doctor also would have concluded 
that the surgery was necessary to treat his leukemia. Thus, at 
least in this instance, there is no evidence that disclosure of 
Golde’s financial interest in his cells would have made Moore-
the-patient, better off, and might have needlessly led him to 
reject a competent physician.137 Moreover, even recognizing 
that there are circumstances where a patient’s well-being may 
be compromised by his or her treating physician’s conflict of 
interest, financial or otherwise, and that financial disclosure 
therefore may be an important element of informed consent to 
treatment, the court’s reasoning nevertheless was insufficient 
in its failure to consider Moore-the-research-subject separately 
from Moore-the-patient. When Golde took Moore’s cells for use 
in research without telling him, he committed a wrong to 
Moore-the-research-subject independently of whatever duties 
he owed Moore as a patient. The court failed to acknowledge 
Moore’s transition from patient to research subject, and 
therefore failed to consider the duties owed to Moore in that 
capacity. Had Golde not been his treating physician, or if he 
had had no inkling of the cells’ potential research value at the 
                                                          
 136. According to the California Supreme Court, Moore alleged in his 
complaint that before Dr. Golde recommended to Moore that his spleen be 
removed, Golde was “aware that ‘certain blood products and blood components 
were of great value in a number of commercial and scientific efforts’ and that 
access to a patient whose blood contained these substances would provide 
‘competitive, commercial, and scientific advantages.’”  Id. at 481. 
 137. The majority did acknowledge that requiring disclosure could 
undermine a patient’s judgment, but nevertheless viewed such disclosure as 
necessary. See id. at 484–85 (“To require disclosure of research and economic 
interests may corrupt the patient’s own judgment by distracting him from the 
requirements of his health. But California law does not grant physicians 
unlimited discretion to decide what to disclose. Instead, it is the prerogative of 
the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which 
he believes his interests lie. Unlimited discretion in the physician is 
irreconcilable with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate 
informed decision.”) (internal quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted). 
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time of the surgery, he would have been under no obligation, by 
the court’s reasoning, to inform Moore of the value of his cells. 
Nor, by the court’s reasoning, did Dr. Quan or UCLA have any 
duty to obtain Moore’s consent to use his cells. The court’s 
limited holding therefore does little to protect the interests of 
the growing number of contributors of tissue samples who are 
not patients, as becomes apparent in Greenberg v. Miami 
Children’s Hospital Research Institute,138 discussed below. 
In Moore, Justice Broussard, concurring and dissenting, 
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the tort of 
conversion was inapposite.139 He framed the issue not as about 
the right to tissue once it was removed, but rather as about the 
right of an individual to determine the disposition of his of her 
excised tissue before it is removed.140 Justice Mosk, who also 
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion regarding the tort of 
conversion, rejected the majority’s focus solely on the needs of 
the research enterprise, stating that its “single policy 
consideration . . . is outweighed by . . . policies that are 
promoted by recognizing that every individual has a legally 
protectible [sic] property interest in his own body and its 
products,” as well as by considerations of equity, which would 
preclude the “unjust enrichment of any member at the expense 
of another.”141 Giving eloquent voice to the views expressed by 
Dr. Lengauer—the researcher who felt the Lacks family had 
been wronged—Justice Mosk noted that: 
There is . . . a third party to the biotechnology enterprise—the patient 
who is the source of the blood or tissue from which all these profits 
are derived. While he may be a silent partner, his contribution to the 
venture is absolutely crucial . . . but for the cells of Moore’s body 
taken by defendants there would have been no Mo cell line at all. Yet 
defendants deny that Moore is entitled to any share whatever in the 
proceeds of this cell line. This is both inequitable and immoral.142 
Cases that have arisen since Moore have similarly failed to 
properly consider the status of the third parties to 
biotechnology, and have consistently resolved disputes in favor 
of the institutions at which the research took place, albeit 
                                                          
 138. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. 
Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 139. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 499 (Cal. 1990) 
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 501. 
 141. Id. at 515–16 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 516 (footnote omitted). 
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based on different legal theories. In Greenberg, family members 
with children suffering from Canavan disease, a rare genetic 
disorder, along with non-profit organizations with an interest 
in the disease, sought help from defendant Dr. Matalon in 
identifying the genetic mutation causing the illness and in 
developing a test to detect the mutation.143 Plaintiffs provided 
support to Dr. Matalon by contributing tissue, developing a 
patient registry, and raising money.144 Dr. Matalon identified 
the gene and developed the test, but his research institution, 
Miami Children’s Hospital, patented the gene, listed him as an 
inventor, and sought to enforce the patent and collect royalties 
for the test’s performance.145 The plaintiffs, who were not told 
that the gene would be patented and had expected the test to 
be freely available, sued the researcher and institution alleging 
lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust 
enrichment, fraudulent concealment, conversion, and 
misappropriation of trade secrets.146 With the exception of 
unjust enrichment,147 the court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ 
                                                          
 143. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1066–67. 
 144. Id. at 1067. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1068. 
 147. The plaintiffs had alleged that Miami Children’s Hospital was being 
unjustly enriched by collecting license fees under the patent. Id. at 1072. 
“Under Florida law, the elements of a claim for unjust enrichment are (1) the 
plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant, who had knowledge of the 
benefit; (2) the defendant voluntarily accepted and retained the benefit; and 
(3) under the circumstances it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain 
the benefit without paying for it.” Id. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs 
conferred a benefit on the defendants, but the defendants contended that the 
plaintiffs had not suffered any detriment, nor had any plaintiff been denied 
access to testing for Canavan disease. Id. The court held that the complaint 
alleged “more than just a donor-donee relationship,” in that the “facts paint a 
picture of a continuing research collaboration that involved Plaintiffs also 
investing significant resources in the race to isolate the Canavan gene.” Id. at 
1072–73. Under those facts as alleged, the court concluded that the plaintiffs 
had “sufficiently pled the requisite elements of an unjust enrichment claim” 
and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim. Id. at 1073. The 
parties ultimately settled the suit. See Joint Press Release, Canavan 
Foundation (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.canavanfoundation.org/news/09-
03_miami.php (last visited Apr. 27, 2010). Although the terms of the 
settlement are confidential, the Canavan Foundation reported that the 
agreement “provides for continued royalty-based genetic testing by certain 
licensed laboratories and royalty-free research by institutions, doctors, and 
scientists searching for a cure.” Id. 
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claims.148 In particular, the Greenberg court held that Dr. 
Matalon did not have a duty of informed consent with respect 
to the plaintiffs because, unlike Dr. Golde in Moore, he was not 
their treating physician.149 The court then questioned whether 
the duty of informed consent was applicable, under state law, 
to medical research (while acknowledging that the duty did 
apply under federal law, which was not at issue in the case).150 
Even if the duty did apply, moreover, the court held that it did 
not include a duty to disclose the researcher’s financial 
interests in research, because the plaintiffs were tissue donors, 
and not “objects of human experimentation.”151 
Like the majority in Moore, the Greenberg court appeared 
to preference the medical research needs over the concerns of 
research participants.152 Also like the Moore decision, the 
Greenberg court’s reasoning is flawed. Just as the Moore court 
conflated the contexts of medical treatment and human subject 
research in a manner that discounted Moore’s interest as a 
research subject, the Greenberg court confused the differing 
premises underlying informed consent and donation153—again 
to the plaintiffs’ disadvantage. The plaintiffs in Greenberg were 
required by the research institution to sign an informed 
consent document.154 The context of such signature was clearly 
                                                          
 148. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1077–78. 
 149. See id. at 1070. 
 150. Id. at 1070–71. 
 151. Id. at 1071. 
 152. See id. at 1070. 
 153. Because donations are considered gifts and are given without 
consideration, an agreement to donate is considered an imperfect contract that 
is void for want of consideration under common law legal systems, although 
such agreements are considered valid contracts in civil law legal systems. 
Compare 4 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:11 (4th ed. 2008) 
(discussing a lack of consideration in a common law system) with Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 195, 
as amended, § 311 (listing the requirements of contract formation under 
German law, a civil law legal system). The doctrine of promissory estoppel, 
which applies where enforcement of promises unsupported by consideration is 
necessary to avoid injustice, has been used to enforce promises based on 
donations or gifts. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 8:8 (discussing the use of 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce “purely donative gratuitous 
promises”). Although an agreement to donate is not enforceable, when a 
donation is made it acquires the legal status as a transfer of property. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 
cmt. a (2003). 
 154. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. 
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a research context—the whole point of providing their tissue 
was in order to have research performed with their tissues. 
Thus at the time the tissue was provided by the plaintiffs, they 
had been assigned the role of human subject by the institution, 
a role by its nature placed the researcher in a fiduciary 
relationship with the human subjects of research and that 
therefore required researchers to ensure that that their 
participation was freely agreed to and that they were given all 
the information necessary to make a decision.155 In rejecting 
plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court held that 
plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficiently that defendants had 
accepted the trust placed in them by plaintiffs, a prerequisite 
for a finding of breach of fiduciary relationship under common 
law. “There is no automatic fiduciary relationship that attaches 
when a researcher accepts medical donations, and the 
acceptance of trust . . . cannot be assumed once a donation is 
given.”156 However, the court failed to consider that simply 
designating plaintiffs as human subjects, they stood in a trust 
relationship with them and were not free to reject plaintiffs’ 
trust after the fact.157 
The court’s after-the-fact designation of the plaintiffs as 
“donors” similarly seems to misapprehend the significance of 
the context in which such “donation” took place. According to 
the court, plaintiffs “are more accurately portrayed as donors 
rather than objects of human experimentation, and thus the 
voluntary nature of their submissions warrants different 
treatment.”158 However, plaintiffs signed a consent document 
indicating that the purpose of their participation was for a 
                                                          
Supp. 2d 1064, 1068 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 155. See NUERNBERG CODE, supra note 89 (“The duty and responsibility for 
ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who 
initiates, directs or engages in the experiment.”). 
 156. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. 
 157. For reasons not explained by the court, the decision was based on 
state law, not federal, and the court found that Florida law was unclear on 
whether there was a duty of informed consent for research subjects, although 
defendants conceded that a duty “does attach at some point in the 
relationship” Id. at 1070.  Moreover, the court appears to have misunderstood 
the purpose, goals, and duties attendant to human subject research generally, 
and informed consent specifically, under federal law. Oddly, the court fails to 
cite the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 46, and cites FDA regulations despite 
the fact that the research does not appear to have involved FDA-regulated 
products. Id. at 1069. 
 158. Id. at 1071. 
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research purpose, namely, “to identify mutations in the 
Canavan gene which may lead to carrier detection in my 
family.”159 Nothing in the consent process could reasonably 
have alerted plaintiffs to the fact that they were engaging in a 
legal transaction with the defendants, one in which the 
institution had no obligation to act in their best interest. Had 
they been so alerted, they might have made more efforts to 
make an independent assessment of their own best interests 
before agreeing to donate their tissues, for example, by 
requesting the inclusion of specific terms as a condition of their 
donation. 
As a consequence, plaintiffs failed to receive the protective 
benefits of informed consent that should have been affored by 
their status as research subjects, and also were not given the 
requisite access to information and ability to negotiate on equal 
terms that one would expect to accompany the status of donor. 
This status confusion is echoed in the court’s decision in 
Washington University v. Catalona.160 There the dispute was 
between a researcher, Dr. Catalona, and the institution that 
had employed him, but the legal status of the disputed tissue 
samples’ contributors was the key determining factor in the 
court’s ruling. In that case, Dr. Catalona had established a 
biorepository containing an extensive collection of tissue 
samples from patients with prostate cancer, many of whom he 
had treated personally.161 The biorepository was housed at the 
university and funded by the institution.162 Patients were 
invited to participate in genetic research by providing their 
tissue samples to the biorepository and were required to sign a 
consent form.163 The forms typically used the word “donate” to 
characterize the delivery of the sample, and the participants 
were informed that their samples might be used by different 
entities, that they had a right to withdraw from the research 
and have their samples destroyed, and that they did not have 
any claim to the donated tissues or materials or processes 
                                                          
 159. Complaint at 12, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 
Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (No. 00C–6779), available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/20070128_FRAMING.pdf. 
 160. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona (Catalona II), 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007), 
aff’g 437 F. Supp. 2d  985 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
 161. Id. at 670. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 671. 
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derived from them.164 
When he left Washington University, Dr. Catalona sought 
to take the collection with him to his new institution.165 To that 
end, he obtained release forms from the research participants 
indicating that they sought transfer of their samples to him.166 
Washington University then sought a declaration that it owned 
the biorepository and the tissue samples, while Dr. Catalona 
sought a declaration that participants could directly transfer 
their materials to him.167 
The district court held that Washington University owned 
the samples, a decision that was upheld on appeal.168 The 
appellate court framed the question as follows: “[Do] 
individuals who make an informed decision to contribute their 
biological materials voluntarily to a particular research 
institution for the purpose of medical research retain an 
ownership interest allowing the individuals to direct or 
authorize the transfer of such materials to a third party”?169 
The court held that they do not, finding that the samples 
were “inter vivos” gifts from the patients to the institution.170 
The court found that the patients had donative intent, had 
delivered their property to the donee (the institution), and that 
the gift had been accepted by the donee.171 Further, the court 
held that the fact that the consent form included a right to 
revoke or destroy the samples did not negate their gift 
status.172 
Like Greenberg, the court’s decision in Catalona is 
problematic because it confuses informed consent with 
donation. The two documents that the court evaluates to assess 
the tissue contributors’ intent were the consent document and 
the genetics research information brochure.173 These 
documents were signed by the contributors in the context of a 
                                                          
 164. Id. 
 165. Catalona II, 490 F.3d 667, 672 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. at 673, 677. 
 169. Id. at 673. 
 170. Id. at 673–74. 
 171. See Catalona II, 490 F.3d 667, 674–75 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 172. Id. at 675 (“The attachment of a condition to a charitable donation of 
property does not negate or void an otherwise valid inter vivos gift.”). 
 173. Id. at 671. 
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research study in which they were being invited to 
participate.174 Although the term “donation” does appear in 
these documents, it is highly unlikely that participants 
appreciated—nor should they have been expected to 
appreciate—that they were signing away legal rights by 
agreeing to participate in research. Construing the term 
“donation” after the fact as a legal concept under which 
participants retained no rights to control the use of their 
tissues therefore seems to take advantage of their good faith 
belief that they were human subjects participating in research, 
who may have reasonably presumed that the institution was 
obliged to look out for their best interests—expectations they 
would not reasonably have obtained were they donors engaged 
in an arms length negotiation. 
The court also failed to address the troubling issue of 
“waiver.” The consent form signed by the contributors included 
an agreement to waive any claim to “donated” body tissues and 
“the right to any new material or process developed through 
research involving [his] tissues.”175 Such waiver language 
appears to violate federal regulations, against the inclusion of 
exculpatory language in consent documents. These regulations 
state that “[n]o informed consent, whether oral or written, may 
include any exculpatory language through which the subject or 
the representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of 
the subject’s legal rights.”176 The language quoted by the court 
is, at least arguably, “exculpatory” within the meaning of the 
regulations. Yet, by framing the transaction as a donation, the 
court avoided the question of the consent documents’ validity: 
                                                          
 174. Id. at 674. 
 175. Id. at 671 (alterations in original). 
 176. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2009). OHRP has issued a guidance document 
distinguishing between unacceptable exculpatory language and acceptable 
language, which demonstrates the fine line separating the two. See OFFICE 
FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
“EXCULPATORY LANGUAGE” IN INFORMED CONSENT (Nov. 15, 1996), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/exculp.htm [hereinafter 
OHRP INFORMED CONSENT]. For example, according to the guidance, it is 
impermissible to use the following language: “I voluntarily and freely donate 
any and all blood, urine, and tissue samples to the U.S. Government and 
hereby relinquish all right, title, and interest to said items.” Id. However, it is 
permissible to include the following statement in an informed consent 
document: “Tissue obtained from you in this research may be used to establish 
a cell line that could be patented and licensed. There are no plans to provide 
financial compensation to you should this occur.” Id. 
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Because the specific language contained in the consent forms and 
brochures, as well as the circumstances surrounding the 
[contributors’] voluntary decision to donate their biological materials, 
convinces us [they] intended to make inter vivos gifts of their 
materials, we find it unnecessary to address the effect or validity of 
the consent forms’ waiver language . . . .177 
                                                          
 177. Catalona II, 490 F.3d 667, 675 n.7 (8th Cir. 2007). The court also gave 
short shrift to another central tenet of the Common Rule, which is that 
participants may “discontinue participation at any time.”  See 45 C.F.R. § 
46.116(a)(8) (2009).  The consent form signed by participants stated that their 
participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw their consent “at 
any time.” Wash. Univ. v. Catalona (Catalona I), 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990 
(E.D. Mo. 2006). Some of the consent forms indicated that participants “could 
request destruction of their biological materials if they changed their minds 
about participating in the study” while others did not.  Catalona II, 490 F.3d 
at 671. Washington University took the position that it could satisfy 
participants’ request to withdraw by anonymizing the samples while 
continuing to use them for research.  Catalona I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 992. The 
district court appears to have accepted as valid Washington University’s 
assertion and the issue was not reviewed on appeal. However, there is 
certainly room for question whether after-the-fact anonymization satisfies the 
letter or spirit of the federal human subjects regulations. Nevertheless, 
accepting Washington University’s interpretation was consonant with the 
court’s conclusion that the participants did not retain proprietary interests in 
their tissues. 
JAVITT_MACROS_AUTHOR EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2010  3:08 PM 




A.  IGNORING THE “THIRD PARTY” TO RESEARCH: THE MORAL 
AND PRACTICAL DANGERS 
 While one must be careful about making broad 
generalizations from small numbers, the few cases that have 
been decided have confused the legal status of contributors of 
human tissue and have not adequately considered the 
preferences and expectations of human tissue donors. While 
there are important policy objectives that may underlie the 
court decisions—specifically, researchers’ need for unimpeded 
access to samples in order to make discoveries with the 
potential for broad societal benefits—there is danger in an 
enterprise that reflexively preferences the needs of research 
over those of tissue contributors. First, there is moral danger, 
specifically, the risk that in focusing solely on the research 
need for tissue samples we will devalue the human dignity of 
the contributors of those tissues. The Catalona court’s 
willingness to ignore the question of whether the consent 
documents were valid shows how easy it is to overlook 
individual protections in pursuit of objectives with potential to 
benefit many. Justice Mosk, in his dissent in Moore, recognized 
the dangers of such devaluation: 
[O]ur society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to respect 
the human body as the physical and temporal expression of the 
unique human persona. One manifestation of that respect is our 
prohibition against direct abuse of the body by torture or other forms 
of cruel or unusual punishment. Another is our prohibition against 
indirect abuse of the body by its economic exploitation for the sole 
benefit of another person. The most abhorrent form of such 
exploitation, of course, was the institution of slavery. Lesser forms, 
such as indentured servitude or even debtor’s prison, have also 
disappeared. Yet their specter haunts the laboratories and 
boardrooms of today’s biotechnological research-industrial complex. It 
arises whenever scientists or industrialists claim, as defendants claim 
here, the right to appropriate and exploit a patient’s tissue for their 
sole economic benefit—the right, in other words, to freely mine or 
harvest valuable physical properties of the patient’s body: “Research 
with human cells that results in significant economic gain for the 
researcher and no gain for the patient offends the traditional mores of 
our society in a manner impossible to quantify. Such research tends 
to treat the human body as a commodity—a means to a profitable 
end. The dignity and sanctity with which we regard the human whole, 
body as well as mind and soul, are absent when we allow researchers 
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to further their own interests without the patient’s participation by 
using a patient’s cells as the basis for a marketable product.178 
Second, there is practical danger. Public participation is 
essential to successful biobank research. Likewise, public trust 
of the research enterprise is essential to such participation.179 
If prospective contributors of tissue samples perceive that the 
process is unfair, that information important to them is being 
withheld, or simply that their contribution is not appreciated, 
they may begin to object to the use of their samples in 
research—declining participation when given the opportunity 
or even taking legal action when tissue is taken without their 
request.180 Although their chances of success in such disputes 
would be low if current precedent is any guide, such actions 
could nevertheless pose an unnecessary and costly disruption to 
researchers and institutions, and undermine potentially useful 
collaborations between the public and scientists. 
B.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
What, then, is the alternative? Must researchers and their 
institutions open their coffers and shell out millions of dollars 
for what is essentially medical waste, when the  
“manufacturers” of the specimens expended no effort to acquire 
them, may have needed to have them removed for their own 
medical benefit, and, on their own, could not use them to make 
discoveries for the benefit of society?181 For the researchers who 
put in the time and effort to extract from these specimens novel 
and important research findings, and for the institutions that 
support them, demands by tissue contributors for compensation 
or even simply for information may seem like the ultimate 
presumption. Such feelings may perhaps best be expressed by 
                                                          
 178. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 515–16 (Cal. 1990) 
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 179. See Beskow & Dean, supra note 88, at 1447. 
 180. Moore, 793 F.2d at 516 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas H. 
Murray, Who Owns the Body? On the Ethics of Using Human Tissue for 
Commercial Purposes, IRB, Jan.–Feb. 1986, at 1, 5) (“As Dr. Thomas H. 
Murray, a respected professor of ethics and public policy, testified before 
Congress[:] ‘[i]f biotechnologists fail to make provision for a just sharing of 
profits with the person whose gift made it possible, the public’s sense of justice 
will be offended and no one will be the winner.’”). 
 181. See David Korn, Dangerous Intersections: New Proposals to Protect 
Genetic Privacy May Collide with the Public Interest in Fostering Medical 
Research, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Fall 1996, at 55, 59. 
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reference to the old joke about a milliner, who when questioned 
by a customer about why his hats cost so much, when they are 
made of “just a few bits of ribbon,” replies “Madam, the ribbon 
is free.” 
Why, then, should the ribbon (tissue) not be free to a 
researcher seeking to use it to advance science and make 
discoveries for the benefit of human health? After all, its 
research value lies only in the information or products that 
may be derived from it through the input of scientists’ time and 
expertise. Moreover, only in rare instances does a single sample 
prove uniquely valuable, as did Henrietta Lacks’ cells, and that 
value typically is not apparent before the fact. 
However, the true value of the tissue cannot be presumed; 
its assessment requires consultation with the person who 
provided it. In the joke about the ribbon, the milliner has made 
the choice to charge the customer only for his labor and not for 
the materials. Yet presumably the ribbon maker did not donate 
these materials to the milliner. Whether the ribbon maker 
expended any effort to make the ribbon or obtained it for free is 
not the milliner’s concern; he needed the ribbon and was 
required to engage in a conversation with the supplier of the 
ribbon maker about the terms under which the ribbon would be 
supplied. While a single tissue sample may have little 
monetary value, its true value—which includes all of the 
considerations that the public expresses when asked about the 
use of their tissues in research—cannot properly be assessed 
without consulting with those contributors. 
But, it may be argued, there is no consensus about whether 
human tissue, once removed from the body, is even property. If 
it is not property, on what basis do we restrict access to it by 
others? Some might argue that that would be like asking the 
milliner to track down and reimburse the ribbon manufacturer 
who left scraps of ribbon in the milliner’s shop. While it is true 
that there is no legal consensus on the status of human 
tissue—although the issue has been the subject of scholarly 
discussion182—resolution of the property status is unnecessary 
in order to impose an obligation on researchers with respect to 
                                                          
 182. See R. Alta Charo, Body of Research — Ownership and Use of Human 
Tissue, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517 passim (2006); Radhika Rao, Genes and 
Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human Body?, 35 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 371 passim (2007). 
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prospective contributors of human tissue. As both Rebecca 
Skloot’s book and public opinion research reveal, many people 
do harbor strong possessive, or at least protective, feelings 
towards their tissue. Such feelings may find their source in 
religious views on the body—as is the case with Henrietta’s 
daughter, who believed that her mother’s soul, in some sense, 
resides in her cells.183 Alternatively, they may reside in notions 
of bodily integrity, i.e., the conviction that, as a matter of 
autonomy, individuals should retain the power to control the 
use of their body parts by virtue of the fact that those parts 
originated in, and once were a part of, their body. Even 
individuals who do not care about the fate of their excised 
tissues may well care about whether the information derived 
from that tissue could help, or harm, them in the future. Thus, 
there are numerous non-property based reasons rooted in 
religion, autonomy, or privacy—including individual,184 
family,185 and group186 privacy—why tissue contributors may 
                                                          
 183. SKLOOT, supra note 2, at 266; see also Harmon, supra note 9 (stating 
that to the Havasupai tribe, “blood has deep spiritual meaning”). 
 184. Genetic biobank research raises particular privacy concerns because it 
can reveal personal health information and because of the potential for misuse 
of that information by third parties.  See, e.g., GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., 
U.S. PUBLIC OPINION ON USES OF GENETIC INFORMATION AND GENETIC 
DISCRIMINATION 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/GINAPublic_Opinion_Genetic_Information
_Discrimination.pdf (presenting the results of a 2007 survey of 1,119 American 
adults, which found that 92 percent were concerned that “that results of a 
genetic test that tells a patient whether he or she is at increased risk for a 
disease like cancer could be used in ways that are harmful to the person”). The 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–233, 
prohibits health insurers and employers from discriminating against 
individuals based on their genetic information, but the statute does not 
remedy all of the potential issues that could arise from the disclosure of 
genetic test results. See  Susannah Baruch, Your Genes Aren’t Covered for 
That: One Year Later, Gaps in Genetic Discrimination Legislation Reveal the 
Challenges Ahead, SCI. PROGRESS BLOG, (June 29, 2009), 
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/06/gina-challenges/ (last visited May 11, 
2010). 
 185. Genetic research has implications not only for the research subject, 
but also for his or her family members. See, e.g., Lainie Friedman Ross, When 
Do Family Members Have a Right to Know Genetic Information About a 
Patient?, 337 J. MED. ETHICS 390 passim (2007); see also Béatrice Godard et 
al., Guidelines for Disclosing Genetic Information to Family Members: From 
Development to Use, 5 FAMILIAL CANCER 103 passim (2006) (discussing the 
issues that arise when an individual’s genetic test results indicate that his or 
her family members may be at an increased risk for a particular disease). 
 186. Genetic research enabled by biobanks also has potential implications 
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care, and therefore should be consulted about, the use of their 
tissues in research. 
Respect for these interests requires that would-be 
contributors be asked if they are willing to have their tissue 
used for research, and a meaningful opportunity to decline to 
have it used.187 This choice should be provided whether or not 
the tissue is “deidentified.” Deidentification does not change 
the fact that the tissue was derived from an individual who 
therefore has an interest in being consulted as to its 
disposition, although it may alleviate privacy concerns. While 
some individuals may elect not to contribute their tissues, 
thereby reducing the number of samples available for research, 
providing such choice is a requirement of respectful 
engagement with the contributors. As a practical matter it is 
likely that most people, when treated with such respect, will 
choose to contribute;188 but such choice should not be presumed. 
Also as a practical matter, in most cases it is likely that any 
one individual’s tissue will be individually valuable enough to 
afford significant bargaining power, but if prospective 
contributors do possess such ability to bargain, either 
individually or collectively, then researchers will need to weigh 
the importance of the research against their willingness and 
ability to meet the terms.189 
                                                          
for group identity. See Dena S. Davis, Groups, Communities and Contested 
Identities in Genetic Research, 30 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 
passim; Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, Genetic Research And 
Culturally Specific Risks: One Size Does Not Fit All, 16 TRENDS IN GENETICS 
93 passim (2000).  For example, research conducted on samples from the 
Havasupai tribe suggested that tribe’s ancestors had crossed the frozen Bering 
Sea to arrive in North America, which “flew in the face of the tribe’s 
traditional stories that it had originated in the [Havasu Canyon] and was 
assigned to be its guardian.”  See Harmon, supra note 9. The tribe was further 
concerned that this information could potentially threaten the tribe’s rights to 
its land; according to Edmond Tilousi, the tribe’s vice chairman, their origin 
from the canyon was “the basis of [their] sovereign rights.” Id. 
 187. See, e.g., E. Vermeulen et al., A Trial of Consent Procedures for Future 
Research with Clinically Derived Biological Samples, 101 BRIT. J. CANCER 
1505, 1505 (2009); see also B. Saunders, Normative Consent and Opt-Out 
Organ Donation, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 84, 84 (2010). 
 188. See supra Part III.B. 
 189. See Sharon F. Terry, Learning Genetics, 22 HEALTH AFF. 166 passim 
(2003) (describing the experience of the mother of two children with a genetic 
disorder, pseudoxanthoma elasticum (PXE), who founded an advocacy 
organization through which she was able to identify and patent the gene with 
the causative mutation and thereby control access to samples in a blood and 
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Because of the problem of status confusion discussed 
above, there needs to be clear separation between the 
researcher-subject interaction and the donor-recipient 
interaction. When tissue contributors sign a consent document, 
they are being informed of the risks and potential benefits of 
research participation to them. In contrast, when individuals 
are asked to contribute their tissues, they are being invited to 
engage in a legal transaction under which they make a gift of 
themselves to the researcher and institution, and the terms of 
that gift should be clearly delineated. 
To be sure, there will be overlap between the domains of 
information needed by subjects and donors. For example, both 
would-be subjects and prospective donors need to be told if 
research results will be returned to them, since such results 
could be considered a benefit of research participation and also 
could be a factor that a donor considers in deciding whether to 
make a donation. Similarly, both would-be subjects and 
prospective donors need to know about the researcher and 
institution’s financial interests in the research. However, the 
status of research subject does not carry with it the ability to 
negotiate terms of participation, whereas the status of donor 
does. Additionally, the informed consent process presumes a 
fiduciary duty by the researcher and institution to the subject, 
and, because of this duty, prohibits the inclusion of exculpatory 
language in the informed consent document under which the 
subject waives legal rights. In contrast, a donation agreement 
presumes equal bargaining power and the ability to negotiate 
terms of the donation. For these reasons, the consent document 
should not be used as the vehicle for the legal transfer of tissue 
from the individual to the researcher. 
The separation of contributor-as-subject and contributor-
as-donor could be accomplished by, for example, first providing 
a consent form that outlines the purpose of the research and 
the risks and benefits of participation, and then providing a 
separate “donation agreement” that makes clear the terms of 
the legal transaction and the parties to that transaction.190 
Although requiring separation of consent to research and 
agreement to donate may seem like a proposal for adding yet 
                                                          
tissue bank containing specimens from individuals with PXE). 
 190. For research not covered by the Common Rule or other federal human 
subject regulations, researchers or institutions should nevertheless be 
required to provide a donation agreement to prospective contributors of tissue. 
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another piece of paper to an arguably already cumbersome 
process, the small piece of paper is performing a huge ethical 
and legal task; simultaneously protecting the ethical principles 
embodied in the requirement for informed consent while 
ensuring that the proper legal framework is applied to human 
tissue donations. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The events that took place with respect to Henrietta 
Lacks’s cells are long past. However, by casting our gaze 
backwards at these events, while reviewing what is currently 
known about public attitudes toward the use of tissue samples 
in research and the legal disputes that have arisen from such 
use, allows the identification of limitations in the current legal 
approach to the use of such tissues. Moreover, the exercise 
enables the development of  new legal and ethical framework to 
govern interactions between prospective donors of tissue and 
the researchers and institutions who receive them. 
 As Justice Mosk recognized in 1990, there is a “third 
party” to human tissue research: the contributor of the human 
tissue. Rebecca Skloot’s account of one of these contributors, 
Henrietta Lacks, shows the harms that can result—in the form 
of feelings of betrayal and distrust—when the interests of these 
third parties are not considered fully and their legal status not 
prospectively defined. Subsequent case law has continued to 
devalue the interests, and to misconstrue the status, of these 
third parties. Recent public opinion research demonstrates that 
these third parties have definite, although not uniform, 
preferences and expectations with respect to the use of their 
tissues. The human subject framework is an inappropriate, and 
inadequate, vehicle for mediating the legal interests of these 
third parties. 
Thus what is needed is a legal approach, perhaps best 
accomplished through new federal legislation that establishes 
prospectively clear, uniform terms of engagement between the 
three parties to the tissue research enterprise and that 
acknowledges prospectively the two distinct roles being played 
by contributors of tissues, those of research subject and of 
tissue donor. The law need not dictate precise terms, for 
example, whether researchers must return results, or whether 
or not tissue contributors should share in any benefits deriving 
from the research; rather, the law need only create a 
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framework that ensures that contributors of tissue understand 
the dual roles they are being asked to play and are provided 
information and context appropriate to each of those roles. In 
particular, the framework should ensure that all parties to the 
enterprise have equal access to relevant information, so that 
one party does not disadvantage the other through inadequate 
information disclosure and that contributors are not 
disadvantaged after the fact by judicial role confusion. 
Mandating that roles be properly defined at the outset, and 
that information appropriate to each of these roles be provided, 
will ensure fairness to the parties, protect the principles 
underlying the human subject protection framework, and, 
perhaps most importantly, help “maintain the trust and 
goodwill” of human-tissue contributors, which is “pivotal to the 
success of the research enterprise.”191 At the heart of the wrong 
perceived by the Lacks family is that Henrietta “didn’t donate 
nothing.”192 Instead, researchers “took [the cells] and didn’t 
ask.”193 How fitting it would be if the development of a new, 
transparency-based framework for tissue donation, one that is 
premised on the simple notion that tissue contributors should 
be asked—within a context that allows a meaningful answer—
was Henrietta Lacks’s true legacy. 
 
                                                          
 191. See Beskow & Dean, supra note 88, at 1447. 
 192. SKLOOT, supra note 2, at 169. 
 193. Id. 
